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Abstract
The classic Diamond-Dybvig model of banking assumes perfect
competition and abstracts from issues of moral hazard, hardly appro-
priate when considering modern UK banking. We therefore modify the
classic model to incorporate franchise values due to market power; and
risk-taking by banks with limited liability. We go further to show how
the capacity of franchise values to mitigate risk taking may be under-
mined by the bailout option; with explicit analytical results provided
for the case of extreme risk-aversion. After a brief discussion of how
this may impact on the distribution of income, we outline the ways in
which the Vickers Report seeks to remedy these problems.
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There are few ways a man may be more innocently employed than in
getting money. Samuel Johnson (1775, letter to his printer)
1 Introduction
This quotation from the illustrious lexicographer was penned shortly before
Adam Smith published his metaphor of the Invisible Hand. Yet it seems
to express the same sentiment – that the pursuit of profit may be good for
economic welfare. Adam Smith cited the butcher, the brewer and the baker
to make his point; but should the same logic not apply to the banker? To
judge from the textbooks, it should.
In the classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example, it is
shown how banks can provide liquidity insurance to their customers while
at the same time providing finance for longer term investors; and that the
magic of maturity transformation (that raises the expected utility of all its
customers) can be achieved under a zero profit constraint.1 As Stiglitz (2012)
argues forcefully in The Price of Inequality, however, a less benign view of
the operations of banks is called for in the light of the recent North Atlantic
financial crisis – involving not only the US and the UK but also Iceland and
Ireland, countries whose economies were ravaged by losses in banking.
In this spirit, we modify the model of Diamond and Dybvig to include
imperfect competition and excess risk-taking. The monopoly profits implied
by the former can be thought of as the seigniorage collected by private banks
who have the licence to create money; while excess risk-taking is used to
symbolise the problems of moral hazard in an industry where bankers can
allocate funds without depositors being aware of what is being done with
their money.2 An alternative – and less flattering – characterisation of the
moral hazard problem is that offered by Gertler et al. (2010) and Gertler and
Karadi (2012), where the hidden action taken by bank managers is to divert
profits to their own benefit3.
It has been argued, however, that seigniorage profits may have the ben-
eficial side effect of checking moral hazard; that the prospect of losing ones
banking licence will inhibit excess risk-taking by big banks who see them-
selves as Too Big To Gamble. This optimistic line of reasoning is, we believe,
fatally flawed because it ignores the leverage that large banks can exert on
1It is, of course, subject to the curse of coordination failure (in the form of bank runs);
but this can be handled by a Lender of Last Resort or by deposit insurance.
2See Allen and Gale (2007), Chapter 9 for the asset price implications of agency prob-
lems of this kind.
3i.e., it is a model of looting to use the terminology of Akerlof and Romer (1993).
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society to provide bailouts. If the market power that yields seigniorage also
means that the bank is Too Big to Fail, then it will exacerbate rather than
curing excess risk-taking4.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the high concentra-
tion and profitability characteristic of recent UK banking, we use a graphical
exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig model – and a focus on a monopoly bank
– to show how restricted competition allows banks to raise profits and col-
lect seigniorage, essentially by restricting the supply of money so that the
marginal cost matches marginal (not average) revenue. The incentive for
risk-shifting due to limited liability is discussed next; and the impact that
monopoly profits augmented by risk-taking can have on income inequality is
illustrated using Lorenz curves.
Using an example with extremely risk-averse depositors to illustrate the
notion that banks may be Too Big To Gamble5, the incentive to play safe
so as to keep ones licence is set against the temptation to take on excess
risk. For the same type of depositors, we then show how bailout prospects
(that effectively insure the banking licence) can undermine prudence as banks
become Too Big To Fail. (Noss and Sowerbutts (2012) have used empirical
methods to estimate the option value of bailout prospects for UK banks:
in the same vein, explicit results for the value of prospective bailout in our
simple model are presented in an Annex.)
We argue heuristically that, when regulatory capital is plotted against
market concentration, these contrary effects of market power will produce
a U-shaped prudential frontier. Finally, this framework is used to appraise
the proposals in the Vickers report (Independent Commission on Banking,
2011), designed both to promote competition in British banking and to get
the taxpayer ”off the hook” by reducing risk-taking.
2 Some key features of UK Banking
Historically, UK bank balance-sheets have stood at half one years GDP. But
banking has grown much faster than GDP in recent times – to about twice
GDP by 1988 and five times by 2008 (Haldane et al., 2010, p.84). The key
players are universal banks which combine retail & commercial banking with
wholesale & investment activities; and the industry is highly concentrated.
4In 2008, for example, a UK High Street bank tried to buy Lehman Brothers New York
before bankruptcy (a gamble that was blocked at the last minute by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer).
5Numerical examples of low and high risk- taking call for regulatory capital require-
ments that stand comparison with those proposed by Miles et al. (2012).
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This is especially true of the retail and commercial sector where the top five
banks account for almost 85% of current accounts, 82% of residential mort-
gages and handle 91% of the customers from Small and Medium Enterprises
(Independent Commission on Banking, 2011, p.21-22).
The increase in balance sheets described above was accompanied by a
dramatic rise in measured value added, especially profits. For 30 years after
World War II, financial intermediation had accounted for around 1.5% of
economy wide profits on average: but by 2008, its share of profits had risen
to 15%. Those in the industry argued that this resulted from financial inno-
vation and financial engineering; and, since the doubling of leverage from the
late 1990s until just before the crisis was accompanied by a halving of the
fraction of risk-weighted assets, it seemed plausible that banks were expand-
ing their business and profits without taking excessive risk. But subsequent
developments tell a very different story. As Vickers (2011, p.2) remarked:
“One of the roles of financial institutions and markets is efficiently to man-
age risks. Their failure to do so - and indeed to amplify rather than absorb
shocks from the economy at large - has been spectacular.” Two insolvent
UK mortgage banks had to be nationalised; and two universal banks were
bailed-out with taxpayers money. Capital support provided by the Treasury
totalled £70b (5% of GDP) by the end of 2009; and these operations were
accompanied by Quantitative Easing (bond purchases) to the tune of £200b
(14% of GDP) by the Bank of England. Adding in other measures, such as
guarantees and collateral swaps, Alessandri and Haldane (2009, p.24) calcu-
late that total emergency financial support provided by the Central Bank
and the Treasury amounted to almost three quarters of one years GDP!
3 Adding Seigniorage and Gambling to a Clas-
sic Model of Banking
The classic model of banking, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), focuses on the
efficiency of banks in providing liquidity insurance to customers. In its basic
form, as presented in Allen and Gale (2007, Chpater 3) for example, banks
are assumed to be perfectly competitive and free of moral hazard problems.
This is where we start, before looking at the profits that may be collected by
a monopoly bank. (By analogy with the seigniorage that the state derives
from its monopoly in supplying notes and coin, this revenue flow will be
referred to as private seigniorage.)
For convenience we proceed diagrammatically, using Figure 1 where the
axes measure early and late consumption. The indifference curve shows the
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expected utility of consumers who will not discover whether they need to
consume early or late until after the investment decision has been made,
but do know the probability of being one or the other. The investment
options for banks that take consumer endowments as deposits are either to
invest in a short-term asset (cash), which has a payoff of 1 in period 1 or
in period 2; or in a long-term asset, which has a higher payoff of R > 1,
but this is only available in period 2. The outside option, upon which banks
must improve if they are to attract risk-averse depositors, is the so called
no-banking equilibrium at point N , where agents initially hold either short
or long (in proportions that reflect known population parameters) and then
trade with each other when their preferences become known6.
M
N
C
Early Consumption
Consumers’
Offer Curve
Late
Consumption
R
1
Constant
Expected
Utility
Banks’ No-Profit Constraint
S
Figure 1: Banks as providers of liquidity: monopoly vs. perfect competition.
The resource constraint shown passing through line N indicates the com-
binations of early and late consumption which the bank can provide while
6See Allen and Gale (2007, Chpater 3) for further discussion.
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satisfying the No-Profit Constraint7. Clearly, the more early consumption
they offer the less the bank can invest in the long-term asset.
In the competitive equilibrium at point C, where the Consumers Offer
Curve8 intersects the No-Profit Constraint, the provision of liquidity insur-
ance by the banks improves on the outside option by offering extra first
period consumption, at the cost of less long-term investment9.
The point selected by a monopoly bank is at point M on the Offer Curve
where profits are at a maximum. As the monopolist keeps some of the re-
turns on long-term investments as profit, consumption now lies below the
No-Profit Constraint, so the average depositor will be worse off10. It also in-
volves redistribution, as bank shareholders will be better off as they enjoy the
seigniorage collected by private sector banks (with their consumption indi-
cated by a point such as S lying above the No-Profit Constraint). Capitalis-
ing such profits gives the franchise value of those involved in non-competitive
banking.
The offer curve in Figure 1 above implicitly gives the demand for liquidity
supplied by commercial banks: in what follows, we derive the “demand for
money” explicitly and use it to estimate the seigniorage profits earned by the
private sector.
3.1 Monopoly Bank
With competetion, the demand for liquidity at an opportunity cost of R, is
shown at point C in Figure 1. Using the notation of Allen and Gale, we
analyse how a monopoly bank can “adjust” the effective price of liquidity R˜
so as to affect depositors demand for liquidity c1 − 1 (where 1 is the early
consumption available as an outside option). Since the actual interest rate
is R the profit of the monopoly bank will be
pi = λ(R˜−R)(c1 − 1)
= λR˜(c1 − 1)− λR(c1 − 1) (1)
7With competition, late consumers receive all payoffs from the long-term investment
of funds not held in cash for early consumers: but this will not be true with imperfect
competition.
8Indicating the ex ante choice between early and late consumption at different interest
rates, i.e., points at which lines of different slopes emanating from N are tangent to the
indifference curves.
9As indicated, the competitive equilibrium satisfies the condition for inter-temporal
optimality (i.e., the interest rate matches the ratio of marginal utility of consumption at
different dates).
10With monopoly restriction in the supply of liquidity, the condition for inter-temporal
optimality is no longer satisfied.
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where the first term indicates the revenue to the bank obtained by raising
the “price” to R˜, and the second indicates the cost of holding cash reserves
to meet the requirements for early consumers.
Assuming CRRA utility with risk aversion γ > 1, the demand function
of depositors can be written as
c1 − 1 = R− R˜
1/γ
R˜1/γ + λR˜/(1− λ) ≡ f(R˜), R ≤ R˜ ≤ R
γ. (2)
Given R ≤ R˜ ≤ Rγ, the demand function is downward-sloping in R˜, i.e.,
f ′(R˜) < 0.
The liquidity demand under perfect competition is the when the price of
liquidity is equal to the marginal cost R˜ = R, i.e.,
cc1 − 1 =
R− R˜1/γ
R˜1/γ + λR˜/(1− λ) . (3)
What if the supply is restricted under conditions of imperfect competi-
tion? Consider specifically the case of a monopolist who rations the quantity
of liquidity so as to maximise profits, i.e., maximises (1) subject to (2). This
yields the first order condition (FOC)
λ[(R˜−R) + (c1 − 1)(∂R˜/∂c1)] = 0.
Hence we may write
R˜−R + (c1 − 1)/f ′(R˜) = 0, (4)
where the second term in (4) reflects the fact that the bank takes into account
that price adjustment can affect demand for liquidity.
Replacing c1 − 1 in (4), using (2), one has
R˜−R + f(R˜)/f ′(R˜) = 0. (5)
Note that for R ≤ R˜ ≤ Rγ, f ′(R˜) < 0; so clearly the price of liquidity under
monopoly R˜M , the solution to (5), must lie above R. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 below.
The resulting profit, measured by λ(R˜M − R)(cM1 − 1) is the flow of
seigniorage accruing to the private sector. In the analytically tractable case
of infinite risk aversion, (γ →∞), discussed further below, seigniorage profits
are simply: (R− 1)(1−λ), where λ is the fraction of the population who are
early consumers. How seigniorage changes with the degree of risk aversion
and the degree of concentration is discussed elsewhere.
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Figure 2: The demand for money and the flow of private seigniorage.
How, with oligopoly, equilibrium will lie between C and M in Figure 2
is discussed in detail in Miller et al. (2013). It is easy to see, however,
that increasing the number of banks will take equilibrium from monopoly to
competition.
In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with two banks, with each maximising
its profits conditional on the supply of the other, the supply of liquidity will
expand beyond that of the monopolist, as suggested in Figure 3.
4 Bank profits: productivity miracle or mi-
rage?
Of the extraordinary expansion of US banking in the lead-up to the financial
crisis, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p.210) remarked:
The size of the US financial sector more than doubled, from an
average of 4% of GDP in the mid-1970s to almost 8% of GDP by
2007 Leaders in the financial sector argued that in fact their high
returns were the result of innovation and genuine value-added
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Figure 3: Seigniorage flow with duopoly.
products, and they tended to grossly understate the latent risks
their firms were undertaking.
This parallels closely what we have reported above for the UK. But, be-
fore looking at the profits that might be expected to arise from excessive
risk-taking (given limited liability), consider first the case of a genuine im-
provement in the return to long term investment available only to banks –
a productivity miracle that raises the return available to banks – but not
outsiders – from R to RH .
How this affects profits and liquidity provision is indicated in Figure 4,
where the No-Profit Constraint swivels clockwise, but the Intertemporal Op-
timisation schedule swivels the other way. As a consequence, the competi-
tive bank equilibrium shifts from C to C ′, with no increase in profits. With
monopoly banking, however, consumers gain much less. Since the productiv-
ity gain is, by assumption, not available outside banking, there is no change
in the outside option, so equilibrium moves from M to M ′ along the existing
offer curve. Profits will increase greatly.
So far so good: but what if the so-called productivity increase is a mirage?
What if – along the lines suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff – there was
9
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Figure 4: A productivity improvement in banking: competition vs.
monopoly.
little or no increase in expected return; and the apparent increase in bank
profitability is the upside of a gamble whose downside was concealed? Then,
as long as the gamble pays off and regulators and depositors are both fooled,
equilibrium will shift to M just as before, with little increase in consumption
for the average depositor, but a large increase in profits and shareholders
consumption as in the Figure. When the gamble fails the truth will out and
the bank will fail too.
To see whether and when banks will be tempted to take on excessive
risk, we use the analytically tractable case of Leontief preferences for which
consumers choose the same consumption in both periods. As can be seen
from Figure 5 the expected utility curves in this case are L-shaped, with
the kink lying on the 45 degree line. Gambling is assumed to take the form
of mean preserving spreads whose attraction lies in the “risk-shifting” that
limited liability permits.
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4.1 Perfect competition
For this case, the competitive equilibrium without gambling is defined by
c1 = c2 = c, (6)
(1− λ)c2 = R(1− λc1); (7)
where equation (7) is the zero profit condition. Solving (6) and (7) yields
the competitive contract is (c, c) where c = R/(1− λ+ λR), as shown at the
point labelled C in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Commercial banking with Leontief preferences.
What would be the deposit contract under perfect competition if banks
can gamble? Assume that there is a gamble available with high and low
payoffs, RH > R > RL, and probabilities pi, 1− pi respectively, and that it is
a meanpreserving spread relative to the return of R, so piRH+(1−pi)RH = R.
For simplicity, we also assume that the cost of capital is R. Given Leontief
preferences and the capital requirement of k, the deposit contract must satisfy
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(6) and the zero profit condition
pi[(1 + k − λc1)RH − (1− λ)c2 −Rk] + (1− pi)(−Rk) = 0, (8)
where the first term on the LHS of (8) represents expected payoff to the bank
in the high state and the second term reflects limited liability, i.e., in the bad
state, the bank loses at most its capital.
Solving for the deposit contract using (6) and (8) yields
cG = [RH + (RH −R/pi)k]/(1− λ+ λRH). (9)
To avoid gambling under perfect competition, one has to choose k such that
c ≥ cG. This implies the critical capital requirement of
kC =
pi(1− λ)(RH −R)
(R− piRH)(1− λ+ λR) . (10)
4.2 Monopoly
A monopolist will maximise profits by increasing the cost of liquidity supplied
to its customers. In the case of extreme risk aversion where long returns are
R, profits will be at a maximum at the point shown as M , where the second
period consumption is reduced to 1 and the consumer is no better off than
in the non-bank equilibrium, shown at point N .
How much seigniorage will the monopoly bank collect? Monopoly profits
measured at date 2 defined as: ΠM ≡ R(1 − λc1) − (1 − λ)c2. So given
the contract of (cm, cm) where cm = 1, we can write the flow of seigniorage
accruing to the bank as
ΠM = (1− λ)(R− 1). (11)
When this is capitalised at a discount rate of δ, this provides the franchise
value of the monopoly bank, namely
V ≡ ΠM
1− δ =
(1− λ)(R− 1)
1− δ . (12)
What if the monopolist can increase profits by risk taking? With the
monopoly contract of (1,1) as before, the expected monopoly profit (mea-
sured at date 2) will be:
ΠG ≡ pi[(1− λc1)RH − (1− λ)c2] + (1− pi) · 0
so
ΠG = pi(1− λ)(RH − 1). (13)
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To see graphically how this increases expected profits, note that – with
a mean preserving spread – the expected second period value of the banks
portfolio will be measured by the same line as that showing the return on the
safe investment R (the line passing through NC in Figure 5). But owing to
limited liability the expected cost of payments to depositors will fall, so the
expected cost of the (1, 1) contract in period 2 becomes pi, as indicated by
the point so labelled in the Figure. Compared to M , this implies an increase
in the flow of expected profits. Nevertheless, the risk of losing the franchise
may prevent gambling.
For the franchise value V to prevent gambling, it is necessary that:
ΠG − ΠM ≤ (1− pi)δV, (14)
or equivalently,
pi(RH − 1) ≤ (1− piδ)(R− 1)
1− δ . (15)
For checking gambling, capital requirements may be imposed as a supple-
ment to, or a substitute for, the franchise value. Note that, if the cost of
capital is R, the profit function to a monopoly bank who invests prudently
remains unchanged even with added regulatory capital. This is because
ΠM(k) = R(1 + k − λc1)− (1− λ)c2 −Rk = ΠM(k = 0).
However, adding the risk of losing regulatory capital at end of period, ex-
pected profits for a gambling monopoly become:
ΠG(k) ≡ pi[(1 + k − λc1)RH − (1− λ)c2 −Rk] + (1− pi)(−Rk)
= pi(1− λ)(RH − 1)− k(R− piRH) (16)
= ΠG(k = 0)− k(R− piRH).
The second line is obtained under monopoly contract c1 = c2 = 1.
So NGC is
ΠG(k)− ΠM ≤ (1− pi)δV. (17)
This can be rewritten as
ΠG(0)− ΠM(0) ≤ (1− pi)[δV + k(R− piRH)/(1− pi)],
indicating that k is a substitute for δV .
The critical value of k can be found when the above is an equality, yielding
k∗ =
1− λ
R− piRH
[
pi(RH − 1)− (1− piδ)(R− 1)
1− δ
]
. (18)
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4.3 Monopoly with Bailout prospect
A monopoly bank may well be able to count on a bailout by the authorities,
where the bank loses its regulatory capital but retains its franchise. Let the
probability of such a bailout be denoted as β, where β can range from 0 to
1. For the discounted franchise value δV to prevent gambling it is necessary
that:
ΠG(k)− ΠM ≤ (1− pi)(1− β)δV. (19)
Note that a greater prospect of bailout calls for higher k. When β = 0, the
above NGC reverts to that without bailout. When β = 1, the critical level
of capital requirements becomes
k∗B =
1− λ
R− piRH [pi(RH − 1)− (R− 1)] > k
∗. (20)
Similar calculations may of course be repeated for oligopoly cases.
In the Table that follows, franchise values, etc. are computed for gambles
involving “tail risk” as discussed in Foster and Young (2010). For the two
point process being considered pi ≥ 0.9 is sufficient for tail risk; and we set
that pi = 0.9. In both cases the gambles have an expected return equal to
the safe rate which is set at 1.04, as in Foster and Young (2010). But we
depart from their assumption that the downside is zero. As the upside in
the first case we consider is 1.06 and in the second 1.10, so for a probability
pi = 0.9 the downside returns are 0.86 and 0.50 respectively. For convenience,
we assume that λ = 0.5 and the appropriate formulae are given in column 2.
The numerical results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of the table.
It may be interesting to start by considering the incentives for gambling
by competitive banks and the capital requirements needed to check them, see
Kuvshinov (2011) for such calculations in respect of the model of Hellmann
et al. (2000). Without regulation, free competitive banking would result in
contracts which mimic those available to alpha investors who can obtainRH
for sure, namely 2RH/(RH + 1), instead of2R/(1 +R). If such gambling is to
be checked, the attractive offers that gambling permits, see (8) above, need to
be brought down to what prudent investment allows by capital requirements
set at the level as indicated earlier in equation (10). The numerical results
for low and higher variance gambles shown in the bottom line of the Table
are capital ratios of 10% or 53% of deposits respectively, which, with λ = 0.5
correspond to ratios of 17% and 52% of RWA respectively.
Notice that, for the parameters we use, the critical capital requirements
for monopoly with bailout (k∗B) are only a little smaller than those for com-
petitive banks (kC) - compare the last two rows of the Table. Thus for the
low variance gamble in the third column, the capital requirement needed to
14
Table 1: Outcomes with risk aversion with Leontief preferences and RL > 0.
a
Formula for λ = 0.5
No Gambling R = 1.04
Competitive
contract 2R/(1 +R) (1.02, 1.02)
Monopoly
contract (1, 1) (1, 1)
Monopoly Profit (R− 1)/2 0.02
Franchise Value
(Seigniorage) V = (R− 1)/[2(1− δ)] 0.2
Gambling RH = 1.06, RL = 0.86 RH = 1.1, RL = 0.5
σ = 0.06 σ = 0.18
Expected
Monopoly Profit pi(RH − 1)/2 0.027 0.045
NGC (monopoly) pi(RH − 1)/2− (R− 1)/2
see equation (14) ≤ (1− pi)δV Satisfied Not satisfied
k∗ (monopoly) No need for 0.14
See (18). capital buffer ≈ 22% RWA
Capital requirement
in special case 0.08 0.50
of β = 1. See (20). ≈ 14% RWA ≈ 50% RWA
k∗ (competition) 0.10 0.53
See (10). ≈ 17% RWA ≈ 52% RWA
a Notes: R = 1.04, pi = 0.9; δ = 0.9; λ = 0.5; piδ = 0.81.
ensure prudent investment by a monopolist is 8% of deposits which, with
λ = 0.5, is 14% of risk weighted assets. In the last column, where the gamble
has higher variance, so risk shifting is more profitable, the critical capital
requirement increases to half the level of deposits and half of RWA.
These prudential ratios are broadly comparable to those obtained by Miles
et al. (2012): using a different methodology they suggest that appropriate
levels of capital need to absorb risks are 16-20% of RWA for moderate shocks,
rising to 45% of RWA for large shocks.
Expressed as a percentage of banks balance sheets, the proportion of the
balance sheet of banks to be funded by equity for a monopoly bank are
about 7% and 33%, depending on the variance — much higher than the
15
4% suggested by the ICB and a fortiori the 3% by the Basel Committee on
bank supervision. Our results are more in line with the recommendations of
Admati and Hellwig (2013): they want to cut bank leverage down to single
figures with an equity ratio of 20-30%.
5 Gambling and Gini Coefficient
In the Price of Inequality, Stiglitz emphasises how rent-seeking in the finan-
cial sector has skewed the income distribution to the benefit of high earn-
ers. In the model being used here, it is evident that bank concentration
will lead to an increase in the Gini coefficient compared with competitive
banking: and this effect will become much more pronounced with gambling.
This is illustrated by the stylised Lorenz curves in Figure 6, where σ repre-
sents the fraction of the population owning shares in the all-deposit bank.11
Where ω represents the consumption bundle available to depositors under
monopoly banking, and ω(1 + µ) is the consumption available to the deposi-
tors who are also shareholders enjoying the monopoly premium, µ, in this case
ω = 1/(1+σµ) and the Gini coefficient12 turns out to be (1−σ)σµ/(1+σµ).
When the bank gambles, the premium paid to owner-managers will of course
rise, say to µ˜, shifting the Lorenz curve to ˜OLP in the figure.
In discussing whether the contribution of financial sector is Miracle or
Mirage, Haldane et al. (2010, p.79-80) report that the share of financial
intermediation in employment in UK is around 4%, and that:
the measured productivity miracle in finance has been reflected
in the returns to both labour and capital, if not in the quantity
of these factors employed. For labour, financial intermediation is
at the top of the table, with the weekly earnings roughly double
the whole economy median. This differential widened during this
century, roughly mirroring the accumulation of leverage within
the financial sector.
Using the above formula, a doubling of consumption opportunities for
those in finance would add about 4% to the Gini coefficient, i.e. about
half the rise in Gini coefficient for the UK from 1986 when the Big Bang
took place, to just before the crisis in 2007. (Focusing more narrowly on
Investment Banking, however, the Financial Times reports compensation
running at 6 times the median income in both US and UK.13)
11See Miller et al. (2011) for details.
12i.e., the area OLP divided by O1P in the diagram.
13FT 17th, 2011, Feb Bankers pay: time for deep cuts.
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Figure 6: Rising incomes in financial services and income inequality.
6 Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Crisis
Hellmann et al. (2000) discuss how the loss of franchise, like the loss of reg-
ulatory capital, may inhibit the incentive to gamble. In their case, franchise
values were generated by the regulator fixing a ceiling on deposit rates, but
what if franchise values derive from concentration in the banking industry, as
is being assumed here? If the authorities are in fact willing to bailout large
banks, this will pose a serious problem of moral hazard as high franchise
values will effectively be insured by official action.
This problem has been analysed above by comparing competition and
monopoly where it is assumed, as a special case, that the monopolist is sure
to be bailed out — is definitely “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF). The interesting
result obtained was that regulatory capital required to check gambling was
not too different for these polar extremes of concentration. If we assume
that the willingness of the authorities to bailout banks only kicks in above
a certain level of concentration, then franchise values will work to reduce
gambling below this level, but moral hazard will act the other way above
this level.
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6.1 The U-shaped Prudential Frontier
How the concentration of market power and seigniorage profits in banking
may at first mitigate moral hazard — and then promote it, as banks become
TBTF — is shown in Figure 7, with regulatory capital plotted on the vertical
axis and concentration on the horizontal (measured by the reciprocal of the
number of banks).
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Figure 7: TBTG, TBTF and the U -shaped region of prudent banking.
For a given low-variance risky investment prospect, the region of pruden-
tial banking, where regulatory capital and/or franchise values are sufficient
to prevent gambling, is defined by the U -shaped curve LBR. The section LB
of the no-gambling boundary shows how franchise values may substitute for
regulatory capital so long as there is no prospect of a bailout. But as bailouts
become increasingly likely when concentration increases beyond point M , the
incentive to gamble changes the curvature of the boundary beyond B.
To see why the NGC is U -shaped, consider the incentive effects of in-
creased concentration at a given degree of leverage, i.e., by moving from left
to right along the dotted line in the Figure. It is evident that the capital
requirement, k0, is insufficient to check risk-shifting for perfectly competitive
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banks protected by limited liability; but as the level of concentration increases
(and franchise values grow to absorb more losses), prudent behaviour will be
observed at point a in the Figure as banks become TBTG. With bailouts
increasingly likely for very large banks, however, the government effectively
begins to insure banks against loss of franchise as concentration moves be-
yond point b. (For a monopoly bank, indeed, there is no risk of losing its
franchise). At some point therefore, the incentive effects of franchise value
will be overwhelmed by the temptation to gamble by banks that are TBTF;
who are motivated to take on excessive risk.
6.2 The Crisis Zone
If the U -shaped NGC actually matched the gambles in prospect, and the UK
banking industry lies above it, as indicated in the Figure, there should be
no crisis. As in Hellmann et al. (2000), the regulatory regime will be so de-
signed that gambling is not incentive compatible in this rational expectations
equilibrium.
What if banks are able to take much higher risks unknown to the regula-
tor? In that case, the U -shaped NGC will shift upwards, as indicated by the
dotted schedule, leaving UK banking system in the area labelled Crisis Zone,
where the expectations of the regulators are inconsistent with the activities
of banks. Innovation which allows banks to mimic high returns temporarily
by financial engineering is not sustainable in the long run, however, as Foster
and Young point out; and crisis will occur as a tail risk phenomenon. With
expectations lagging behind the reality, the regulators are in line for a nasty
shock.
If - thanks to rapid financial innovation - the banking system is in the
crisis zone and the relevant authorities are unaware of the excessive risks
being taken, this could be characterised as regulatory failure. Given limited
liability, there are definite incentives for risk-taking (so investors keep the
upside of gambles but walk away from the downside); and we see it rather
as a problem of moral hazard. With bailouts, moreover, these incentives
are greatly strengthened: banks that would have behave prudently, despite
free access to risky investments, will be tempted to take risks if bailouts are
expected - a classic example where insurance against failure leads to hidden
actions that makes failure more likely.
How is this moral hazard to be checked, while avoiding negative exter-
nalitieis of banking collapse? In the next section, we discuss how the Vickers
report seeks to ensure that the banking system no longer lies in such a crisis
region.
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7 Regulatory Reform in the UK: the Vickers
report
On options for reform, consider the 2011 report by the Independent Com-
mission on Banking (ICB) chaired by Sir John Vickers.
To change the strategic relation between the state and banks, the threat
of severe externalities triggered by unpremeditated bank closure must be
thwarted. For retail banks, the means to this end recommended in the Re-
port effectively include (a) improved ex ante monitoring of risk-taking; (b) a
great reduction of risks that may be taken; (c) substantially increased loss-
absorbing capacity on the part of the bank to cover what risk remains; and,
additionally, (d) better resolution procedures should a retail bank need to be
reconstituted.
In more detail, the key thing to note is that the report recommends
changes in market structure as well as balance sheet restrictions. In partic-
ular, structural separation is recommended in the form of a retail ring-fence
designed to isolate and contain banking activities vital to the economy so
as to ensure they can be maintained in the event of bank failure without
government solvency support. Hence, ring-fenced banks would be restricted
to taking retail deposits, providing payments services and supplying credit
to households and businesses14, i.e., they would be constrained to abide by
what Adam Smith would think of as the “principles of the banking trade”!
Ring-fenced banks will in fact be banned from a very considerable range
of the activities currently conducted by universal banks15. This is not the
complete separation mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA, how-
ever, as banks inside the fence can stay linked with those outside, subject
to arms length dealing and other restrictions. In addition steps are recom-
mended to increase competition on the High Street - more transparency of
costs and transferability of accounts, in particular.
Balance sheet requirements involve substantial loss-absorbing capacity in
the form of equity and convertible bonds so as to avoid claims on the taxpayer
following bank insolvency.
As regards monitoring and transparency, ring-fenced banks would be more
straightforward than some existing banking structures and thus easier to
manage, monitor and regulate.
Heuristically, these recommendations can be shown as in Figure 8, which
14ICB (2011, para. 3.1)
15Depending on how the liabilities to large corporations are taken inside the fence, the
ring fence might include between a sixth and a third of the total assets of the UK banking
sector of over 6 trillion (relative to GDP of £1.4 trillion).
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refers only to banks within the ring-fence. Some of the measures should
act to expand the region of Prudential Banking (beyond that in the earlier
Figure 7, indicated here by the dashed U-shape); others to shift the locus of
a ring-fenced bank into this enlarged area.
Regulatory
Capital
Prudent
Banking
Concentration
L′
L′
R′
Higher capital
requirements
and more
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Reduced
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Risk Prohibition
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L
L
R
Figure 8: Checking risk-taking in ring-fenced banks.
The prohibition of many risky assets - two thirds of the current portfolio
of UK banks, in fact - should move the U -curve downwards, as indicated by
the shift from L to L in the No Gambling frontier. Improved monitoring –
backed by a threat of losing ones licence if caught - should further reduce the
region of excess risk by making the frontier slope down more steeply from L.
Steps to move ring-fenced banks towards Prudential Banking include both a
decisive increase in the level of capital required for the operation of a ring-
fenced bank and steps to increase competition among High Street banks, as
indicated by the arrow pointing NW in the Figure.
The effect of the planned reforms would be to:
put the UK banking system of 2019 on an altogether different
basis from that of 2007. In many respects, however, it would be
restorative of what went before in the recent past better cap-
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italised, less leveraged banking more focussed on the needs of
savers and borrowers in the domestic economy. ICB (2011, p.18)
Although the government plans to implement the principal recommen-
dations of the Report, there is considerable lobbying pressure to allow for
risk-taking inside the fence, with retail banks providing simple derivatives,
for example. If permitted, this will surely undermine the principles of struc-
tural separation, Wolf (2012). It has been argued by the Parliamentary Com-
mission on Banking Standards (2012) that the threat of Glass-Steagall, i.e.,
complete separation between investing and commercial banking16, should be
held as a sword of Damocles above the banks to ensure implementation.
8 Conclusion: back to banking basics?
Adam Smith himself would surely have been disturbed by recent develop-
ments in British banking. His concern over the tendency of businesses to col-
lude and appropriate consumer surplus by monopoly pricing is well known.
And as for risk-taking, he warned in the Wealth of Nations that:
To depart on any occasion from [the principles of the banking
trade], in consequence of some flattering speculation of extraor-
dinary gain, is almost always extremely dangerous and frequently
fatal to the banking company which attempts it. (Book V, Ch 1,
Article 1.)
Banking in Britain before the crisis was alas! no example of the benign
operation of the invisible hand at work. The reforms advocated by the ICB in
their Final Report are however designed to offset these distorted incentives.
If they succeed in eliminating the features that we have added to capture
current distortions, then the basic model could be back in business!
16What the Commission refers to as an electrified ring-fence!
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A Derivation of bank’s profit function
The profit of the bank is defined as
Π = (1− λc1)R− (1− λc2). (A.1)
The cost of liquidity R˜ is defined as R˜ ≡ U ′(c1)/U ′(c2). Using CRRA utility,
we have
R˜ = c−γ1 /c
−γ
2 . (A.2)
Replacing c2 in (A.1) using (A.2), (A.1) becomes
Π = (1− λc1)R− (1− )R˜1/γc1. (A.3)
After simplification, (A.3) becomes:
Π = (1− λ)(R− R˜1/γ)− (λR + (1− λ)R˜1/γ(c1 − 1). (A.4)
Simplifying further yields:
Π = (1− λ)(R˜1/γ + λR
1− λ)
(
R˜1/γ + λR˜/(1− λ)
R˜1/γ + λR/(1− λ) − 1
)
(c1 − 1). (A.5)
Therefore:
Π = λ(R˜−R)(c1 − 1). (A.6)
B Valuing the Bailout Prospect
In a recent working paper from the Bank of England, Noss and Sowerbutts
(2012) provide empirical estimates of the value of bailout prospects for banks
in the UK. In our simple model we use here, it is straightforward to obtain the
value analytically by taking the difference of bank values with and without
bailout.
To value a monopoly bank which is gambling without bailout, solve:
W = ΠG(k) + piδW.
So
W =
ΠG(k)
1− piδ =
pi(1− λ)(RH − 1)− (R− piRH)k
1− piδ ,
where ΠG(k) is given by (16).
To value bank with bailout, solve
W b = ΠG(k) + [pi + (1− pi)β]δW b,
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where β represents the probability of bailout. So
W b =
ΠG(k)
1− [pi + (1− pi)β]δ =
pi(1− λ)(RH − 1)− (R− piRH)k
1− [pi + (1− pi)β]δ .
Note that the ratio of these valuations can be written
W b/W = (1− piδ)/[1− piδ − β(1− pi)δ]
which tends to (1 − piδ)/(1 − δ) as β tends to one, and future profits are
discounted by the discount factor δ and not piδ, as bank never fails. This is
the case analysed in the text.
Using the same parameters and assuming λ = 0.5, β = 1 and k = 0, the
values are shown in Table 2. The value of the bailout shown in the last line
ofthe Table is defined as
VBP ≡ W b −max{V,W}.
Table 2: Outcomes with risk aversion γ →∞ (Leontief preferences) and RL > 0 .a
λ = 0.5 Low variance High variance
RH = 1.06, RL = 0.86 RH = 1.1, RL = 0.5
Gambling RL > 0 σ = 0.06 σ = 0.18
Expected
Monopoly Profit pi(RH − 1)/2 0.027 0.045
Capitalised Value
without Bailout 0.142 0.236
(k = 0) W = pi(RH − 1)/[2(1− piδ)] less than V more than V
Capitalised Value
with Bailout W b(k = 0) =
(k = 0) 0.5pi(RH − 1)/[1− piδ − β(1− pi)δ] 0.27 0.45
Value of bailout VBP 0.07 0.214
a Notes: R = 1.04, pi = 0.9; δ = 0.9; λ = 0.5; β = 1; k = 0; and V = 0.2.
,
Note that, for the case of low varaiance, there will be no gambling in the
absence of the bailout. So the value of the bailout prospect is the excess
of W b over the franchise value V , an increase of about a third. For high
variance, however, where the bank is tempted to gamble in the absence of
any bailout, the prospect of guaranteed official rescue is much more valuable.
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It more or less doubles the value of the bank from 0.24 to 0.45, substantially
more than twice the franchise value. Both cases illustrate what Martin Wolf
says in his review of Admati and Hellwig (2013) on where he argues that
“financial fragility is a feature of the system, not a bug. ... The public have,
willy nilly, become risk-bearers of last resort. Protected by this generosity,
bankers gain vastly on the upside while shifting the downside on to others.
At worst, they can devour a states fiscal capacity.” (Wolf, FT, March 17,
2013)
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